Recently, New York State’s Kings County Supreme Court created a carve-out to long-held precedent defining “immediate family” as applied to Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED) cases. These “zone of danger” cases typically involve the sudden, traumatic death of a loved one occurring within close physical proximity to the otherwise uninjured plaintiff. To successfully bring a zone of danger NIED claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant was negligent, (2) the plaintiff was present and witnessed the event, (3) the plaintiff was closely related to the deceased, and (4) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress as a result. The phrase “closely related” refers to members of one’s “immediate family,” typically including a spouse, parents, children, siblings—and now dogs.
DeBlase v. Hill challenged the traditional definition of “immediate family” when the plaintiff filed a NIED claim following the tragic loss of her family dog.1 On July 4, 2023, the defendant, Mitchell Hill, struck and killed the plaintiff’s dog, Duke, while the plaintiff Nan DeBlase was walking the dog on a leash across an intersection in Brooklyn. In the ensuing lawsuit, the defendant moved to dismiss the NIED claims, contending that the plaintiffs had failed to state a valid cause of action because, under New York State law, companion animals have been recognized as property not “immediate family.”
The plaintiffs relied on Greene v. Esplanade, a New York State Court of Appeals case that opened the door to a broader view of familial relationships. In Greene, the Court of Appeals expanded “immediate family” to include grandparents and did not fix the boundaries of “immediate family,” anticipating the need to evaluate changes in social perspectives.2 The court in DeBlase utilized the Greene factors in its decision, noting how the special status, shifting societal norms, and common-sense factors analyzed in Greene were similarly applicable to the facts in DeBlase. Following this logic, the DeBlase court agreed to create an exception to the current NIED rule, arguing that “[a]dhering to unyielding general precedent no longer aligns the law with current societal norms concerning family pets.”
The court, however, used restrictive language in the creation of their new rule stating: “A plaintiff who experiences emotional distress due to witnessing the death of a family pet in the zone of danger proximately caused by a defendant negligently operating a motor vehicle may file a claim for NIED if the pet was leashed to the plaintiff at the time the negligent act occurred and the plaintiff herself was exposed to danger.”
Although the court has imposed specific limitations within DeBlase, the acknowledgment of evolving societal norms and the departure from established precedent indicate a potential for further developments in tort law.
If you have any questions regarding the content of this alert, please contact Bridget Daley Atkinson, associate, at batkinson@barclaydamon.com; Matthew Larkin, Torts & Products Liability Defense Practice Area chair, at mlarkin@barclaydamon.com; or another member of the firm’s Torts & Products Liability Defense Practice Area.
1DeBlase v. Hill, 2025 NY Slip Op 25156 (Sup. Ct., Kings Cty, June 17, 2025).
2Greene v. Esplanade Venture P'ship, 36 N.Y.3d 513 (2021).